Maximising Behaviour of Politicians and Bureaucrats in Competitive Elections and Coalitional Bargaining within a Government of National Unity (GNU)

Maximising Behaviour of Politicians and Bureaucrats in Competitive Elections and Coaling Bargaining within a Government of National Unity (GNU)

Introduction

A public choice theory examines the intersection of economics and political science by analysing government decision-making, emphasizing that government failures often stem from officials acting in their self-interest rather than for public welfare. This perspective challenges the assumption that public servants inherently work towards collective good. The African National Congress (ANC), a prominent South African political party and liberation movement formed in 1992, exemplifies this theory through its involvement in a Government of National Unity (GNU), arising from a coalition with other parties after losing parliamentary majority.

The GNU emphasizes power-sharing, essential for enhancing cooperation among political actors, and manages diverse interests while striving for effective governance. However, the coalition often encounters policy gridlock due to conflicting objectives and ideologies, obstructing consensus and delaying decision-making processes. Niskanen's bureaucratic model highlights that bureaucrats may exacerbate this gridlock by maximizing budgets, affecting coalition dynamics negatively. In contrast, Dunleavy’s Bureau-Shaping Model suggests bureaucrats concentrate on policy shaping and high-status roles rather than simply budget increases, revealing the complexities of political behaviour that impact citizens' welfare and economic prospects. While short-term spending can provide benefits, it poses risks to fiscal stability and reforms are often postponed due to coalition bargaining, with rent-seeking activities resisting necessary changes. Consequently, these dynamics diminish efficiency, service delivery, and sustainable economic growth in South Africa.

Pre-election Vote Maximisation and Popular Spending

Political parties are understood through their competition for votes just as businesses compete for customers. The politicians’ relational objective it to ensure that their decisions maximise their actions’ net value. This involves choosing policies that yield the highest net benefit, maximising values gained relative to values sacrificed. The aim of politicians is to achieve objectives by systematically defining problems, analysing relevant data, weighting each option’s pros and cons, and selecting the best course of action that fulfils desired goals. The policies that are mostly supported by politicians are the ones that voters can easily observe and value, especially when elections are approaching, rather than prioritizing measures that primarily contribute to long term welfare. A voter values immediate benefits more readily than future costs like debt, taxation, or reduced spending thus influencing political decision-making. The logic of vote maximization in political decision making arises from the assumption that candidates and parties aim to maximise the number of votes and this strategy is relevant in proportional representation systems where success depends on securing the highest number of legislative seats. The most important example of vote maximization is increased popular or highly visible government spending before elections (i.e., infrastructure projects, subsidies, etc.). Short-term vote maximization through productive expenditures like health, infrastructure, and education can lead to long-term welfare trade-offs, as policies enhancing citizen welfare might diminish the government’s ability to supply public goods in the future.

South Africa is characterized as a country with high rate of unemployment and inequality. Social grants and public services play a huge role in household contribution. The ANC has historically used a developmental state approach, emphasizing social support and transformation policies to tackle inequality and unemployment through grants and services. Social grants narrow socioeconomic divides by redistributing resources from wealthy individuals to poor. This redistribution reduces inequalities, preventing social unrest and protecting economic stability across society. The public service on the other hand plays an important role in addressing the rate of unemployment. The Department of Employment and Labour (DEL) enforces the Employment Service Act to promote job creation and protect workers. Besides this mandate, the country’s high unemployment rate highlights a weak implementation of employment services. Public employment services are therefore plays an important role for both job seekers and employers, providing information, and targeted support to facilitate labour market development. Governments face pressure to address poverty, unemployment, and inequality, increasing spending for developmental and electoral interests. On the other hand, concerns remain about electoral incentives shaping the timing, composition, and efficiency of government expenditure overall. The issue is critical when financing expenditure through borrowing. South Africa's public debt has significantly risen, restricting fiscal space for development. The IMF noted that public debt reached about 77% of GDP by March 2025, with increasing debt service costs limiting resources for growth-enhancing spending.

This therefore provides an important distinction between the politically motivated expenditure and the productive popular spending. Spending improves long-term welfare and economic capacity through investments in infrastructure, education and healthcare, benefiting citizens immediately while fostering future growth. In contrast, expenditure focusses on short term electoral gains, manifesting in visible projects or subsidies before elections that may not address long term development needs and are primarily aimed at maximizing votes. A distinction between the two is important when evaluating government policy because not all election related expenditure represent rent-seeking or economic inefficiency. The 2024 election resulted in the ANC losing its national majority, leading to a fragmented political landscape. This shift necessitated the ANC to negotiate with other partied to maintain governance. Concurrently, the DA entered national government while preserving its electoral identity and policy agenda

GNU Coalition Bargaining and Policy Gridlock

In an ordinary coalition, parties collaborate to achieve over 50% of the majority. In a government of national unity (GNU), a single party might have a majority but may choose to involve multiple parties due to national crises, indicating that it cannot address these issues alone. Forming a national unity cabinet entails extensive negotiations, often taking 3 to 6 months, particularly due to the historical dominance of the ANC, which has been in power for 30 years and has made decisions based on majority rule. Coalition bargaining involves employers jointly negotiating with unions to establish uniform employment conditions, ensuring consistency across all workers within the bargaining units. Policy disagreements and infighting within the GNU, particularly between ANC and DA, pose serious challenges, raising concerns about coalition stability and intensifying public tensions over unresolved key policy decisions in South Africa. Policy decisions can therefore be the be the product of bargaining rather than an economically optional strategy thus creating the possibility of policy gridlock. Political bargaining can affect economic growth indirectly through uncertainty and delayed investment.

Political gridlock occurs when legislative progress halts due to disagreements among government officials, often when rival parties’ control different government branches. The Senate filibuster is frequently employed to delay legislation, necessitating a supermajority of 60 votes to proceed. Despite gridlock, historical instances, such as the CARES Act, demonstrate that parties can collaborate to pass laws. Factors like the presidential veto and actions by the Senate majority leader can exacerbate gridlock. Compromise between parties is often essential for advancing critical legislation.

Impact of Political Behaviour on Citizen Welfare

The causes of political behaviour are diverse and include personal ambition, ideology, party loyalty, and the request of power and influence. Individuals often engage in political activities to further their own interests or those of their respective parties or ideologies. The consequences of such behaviours can be significant, leading to societal polarization, legislative gridlock, and a deterioration of trust in government institutions. Extreme or diverse actions by politicians may intensify prioritization, making consensus on critical issues increasingly difficult and resulting in legislative standstills. Coalition bargaining can produce policies aimed more at maintaining political compromises than at tackling pressing issues such as poverty, unemployment, and inequality. Furthermore, political behaviour perceived as corrupt or unethical contributes to public disillusionment with the political process and a deadline in trust toward governmental entities. Citizens can remove ineffective governments through elections, and coalition partners can constrain one another’s abuses of power. The loss of the ANC’s majority may therefore have increased incentives for political responsiveness. The GNU highlights inclusive growth, job creation, poverty reduction, lower living costs, and building a capable, ethical developmental state as its main priorities. Vote‑maximising expenditure enhances welfare by aligning government spending with the preference in majority, particularly those of the median voter. This strategy minimises inefficiencies and potential power abuses, leading to a more equitable distribution of resources. By prioritizing median voter demands, society can achieve fairer benefits, greater satisfaction, and improved overall welfare outcomes, as opposed to outcomes derived from unanimity or strictly majoritarian rules

In South Africa, service delivery pertains to the ability of municipalities to provide essential services that improve citizen’s quality of life. Since the democratic transaction in 1994, significant advances have been made in providing water, electricity, housing, and healthcare services to previously marginalized communities. However, challenges persist, with widespread failures in-service delivery undermining progress. The South African Constitution imposes a clear duty on municipalities to ensure the provision of fundamental services such as healthcare, housing, sanitation, clean water, and reliable electricity. Additionally, municipalities are tasked with maintaining infrastructure, ensuring safety, and promoting local economic development, and all these tasks are crucial for stimulating growth and employment opportunities. Effective service delivery is integral to alleviating property, maintaining social stability, and fostering economic development. Failures in this domain lead to increased frustration among residents, diminished trust in government, and hindered developmental goals. Thus, enhancing municipal capacity, accountability, and efficiency is vital for sustaining improvements in the quality of life for all citizens

Consequences of government actions on economic prosperity

The South African government is implementing various initiatives aimed at fostering economic growth and inclusivity amid extreme inequality, where half of the adult population lives in poverty and nearly 40% are unemployed. A primary goal is to create a business-friendly environment by reducing bureaucratic red tape and reforming labour laws to facilitate expansion and attract investment, thus generating job opportunities. Entrepreneurs and the private sector are seen as crucial to this effort, leading to a push for diverse business ownership and improved conditions for doing business. Economic policy reforms also play a significant role, focusing on lowering operational costs and encouraging private sector involvement through amendments to labour laws and trade barriers. Public-private partnerships are being promoted via streamlined legislative frameworks to enhance collaboration between government and industry.

Central to these initiatives is the Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan, aiming to build a resilient economy. This plan highlights key areas such as energy security, industrial development, mass employment, infrastructure growth, macroeconomic reforms, green initiatives, food security, and tourism revitalization. While IMF data indicates a growth rebound of 1.3% in 2025, sustained prosperity requires continuous structural reforms. The current government of national unity (GNU) could enhance economic conditions by uniting political support for reforms, although ideological rifts may hinder progress, posing both opportunities for stability and risks of operational paralysis. These collective efforts reflect the government's determination to create a sustainable and inclusive economy that serves all South Africans.

Theories of bureaucracy (e.g., Niskanen, Dunleavy) applied to South Africa.

//Bureaus are special organizations where profits are not taken as personal income, and they depend on steady funding instead of selling products directly. Dunleavy’s bureau‑shaping theory challenges Niskanen’s idea that bureaucrats always want bigger budgets. He argues that senior officials often prefer small, elite agencies because chasing larger budgets is risky and offers little reward. Prestige and closeness to political power matter more, which explains why UK officials under Thatcher accepted budget cuts and privatization. Dunleavy outlines five strategies: reorganizing, changing work practices, redefining relationships, competing for policy roles, and shifting routine tasks elsewhere.

The theory, however, faces criticism. Defining rational preferences is difficult, and critics say Dunleavy assumes values without proving bureaucrats hold them. Many see it as a guide for conditional predictions rather than a strict causal model. The line between policy and management is blurred, and not all officials prefer policy tasks. The theory also overlooks the role of politicians in shaping bureaucratic choices. Recent studies show new trends: growth of policy‑focused units, outsourcing routine functions, and creating small agencies with limited operations.

//Niskanen’s model rests on two assumptions. One is that bureaucrats maximise the size of their budgets and other the that bureaucrats are in effect simple monopolists who are able to impose their own preferences on the governing political party. In essence, Niskanen presents the relationship between bureau and its sponsor (a government, government review group, or some other representatives, collective body) as a bilateral monopoly. The bureau sells services only to the sponsor and the sponsor buys those services only from the bureau. Output is exchanged for a budget and not at a per unit price. For the purposes of the model, there is one bureaucratic maker, the sensor official in each bureau which has a separate, identifiable budget. The bureau is funded by single government review body which, in turn, is funded from taxes. Demands from the bureau’s output is first determined exogenously but at any level of demand bureaus will over supply because the bureaucrats will seek to maximise the budget of their bureau. The total budget of the bureau is a logical maxim and because budget size will be a positive monotonic function of what Niskanen assumed would be significant variables in the bureaucrat’s utility function: salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power at patronage

Rent-seeking costs and policy paralysis during reforms

//Economic reform is a planned effort to improve a nation’s growth, stability, and overall performance. It usually involves policy changes in areas such as market regulation, fiscal management, trade practices, and institutional design, with the goal of creating a more efficient, fair, and sustainable economy. Policy paralysis, however, occurs when reforms stall because governments lack commitment or fail to reach consensus on details. Nevertheless, the GNU can also create safeguards. Multiple parties participating in government may increase scrutiny because coalition partners have incentives to monitor one another. This inaction prevents necessary laws and reforms from being implemented, weakening progress and undermining economic development.

//Rent‑seeking can raise individual or group wealth without adding real value to society, often through lobbying for subsidies or favourable regulations. While such activities may boost income for beneficiaries, they also reduce efficiency and widen inequality. Monopolistic outcomes distort competition, harming consumers and overall economic welfare. Balancing these short‑term gains against long‑term costs is essential for sustainable growth. Effective policy must limit rent‑seeking’s negative impacts while ensuring reforms promote fairness, efficiency, and stronger economic performance across society. The DA's participation in government, for example, creates political incentives for scrutiny of governance failures, while the ANC and other parties retain their own oversight interests. Rent‑seeking behavior imposes several significant costs on economies. It misdirects resources away from productive investments toward securing privileges, leading to poor allocation and slowing innovation and growth. By fostering monopolies or oligopolies, rent‑seeking reduces competition, raises consumer prices, and diminishes overall welfare. It also worsens inequality, concentrating wealth and influence among a small group while excluding wider society. Another major consequence is deadweight loss, where distorted incentives and monopoly pricing reduce total social wealth and efficiency. These outcomes highlight how rent‑seeking undermines both economic performance and social equity. Addressing such behavior is therefore essential to ensure fairer distribution of resources, stronger competition, and sustainable development. Policymakers must recognize these costs when designing reforms, as limiting rent‑seeking is key to promoting efficiency, equity, and long‑term economic growth. The effectiveness of such monitoring, however, depends on institutions being stronger than narrow party interests