Summary
Highlights
The Fagen Live channel hosts Vyacheslav Maltsev to discuss whether Putin has an exit strategy. The host, celebrating his 55th birthday, asks viewers to like the stream and subscribe to both channels. The discussion quickly moves to Putin's alleged search for ways to pressure Europe to abandon Ukraine and the possibility of opening a second front in the Baltic states or Armenia, given the stalemate in Ukraine.
Maltsev dismisses Armenia as a target due to lack of land borders but considers the Baltic states vulnerable. He notes the recent drone attack on a Russian Corvette in Kronstadt as an indicator of potential shifts. Maltsev argues that despite continuous heavy losses in Ukraine, Putin is maintaining offensive pressure. He believes Putin is driven by a desire for glory and conquest, seeing himself as a 'collector of Russian lands' and emboldened by a perceived lack of consequences for his actions.
Maltsev asserts that Ukraine cannot spare troops to defend the Baltic states, whose armies are small (less than 40,000 combined, plus 10,000 NATO troops). He claims Putin has 6 million people with mobilization orders, enough to launch new offensives. Maltsev also points to reports of American troops leaving Lithuania and a prevalent sense of defeatism in European and Baltic countries regarding a potential Russian attack. He also highlights various signs of Russian military buildup and preparation in the region, including the creation of the Leningrad Military District and deployment of sophisticated weaponry.
Maltsev details how the Baltic states are strategically encircled, with access points easily cut off by Russia. He mentions the Suwalki Corridor, the Baltic Sea's potential for mining, and Russia's nuclear deterrent as key factors limiting outside intervention. He suggests that China and North Korea would support Russia. The speaker cites the high percentage of Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia as another factor, potentially facilitating internal aggression.
Maltsev provides extensive evidence of Russian preparations: the establishment of the Leningrad Military District, the rapid promotion of the 6th Air and Air Defense Army, increased army size, and new laws allowing troop deployment to protect Russian citizens abroad. He also mentions military exercises (Zapad 25), tampering with underwater cables, early opening of the Volga navigation season for military transport, massive ammunition shipments to Kaliningrad, and the deployment of Admiral Nakhimov. Civilian transportation routes to Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg, and Minsk are also experiencing increased military-related traffic under civilian guises. In Kaliningrad, local officials discuss potential blockades, and hastily built aircraft hangars are being constructed to conceal military aircraft. Drone operators are reportedly being redeployed from Ukraine to the Leningrad region.
Belarus is observed fortifying its border with Ukraine, not to attack Ukraine, but to protect its rear flank during a potential Baltic operation. Belarusian infrastructure, including bridges and railways, has been reinforced, indicating preparation for heavy military transport to the Baltic states. Lukashenko is reportedly acquiring combat drones and his defense minister has warned of a high probability of war with the West. Maltsev stresses that all pieces are in place for Putin to launch an attack, with overwhelming military superiority in the region. He also notes the strategic placement of air defense systems and naval assets.
The host questions whether NATO, particularly the US under Trump, would intervene if Russia attacked. Maltsev believes that Article 5 of the NATO treaty is not a strict obligation to intervene militarily but rather to consult the UN Security Council. He argues that an invasion of the Baltic states would be quick and decisive, with Russia capable of cutting off land and sea access within hours. He also contends that an attack on the Baltic states would be far easier than the invasion of Ukraine due to the smaller size of their armies and lack of combat experience. He warns that internal aggression, facilitated by Russian passport holders, would also be a significant factor.
Maltsev concludes by urging immediate action to deter Putin. He predicts that the most dangerous time for an attack is around July, during Russian Navy Day. He emphasizes that the aggression will not be limited to external forces but will also involve internal elements, citing the issuance of foreign passports to Northern Fleet personnel. The ideological justification for the war would be the alleged Western capture of Kaliningrad, a more potent narrative than fighting fascism in Ukraine.