Serhii Plokhy: History of Ukraine, Russia, Soviet Union, KGB, Nazis & War | Lex Fridman Podcast #415

Serhii Plokhy explains that the collapse of communism, the end of the Cold War, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union are interrelated but distinct processes. He emphasizes that the fall of the Soviet Union was primarily a story of imperial collapse, rather than just an ideological or economic one, highlighting the emergence of nationalism, including Russian nationalism, as a destructive force for multi-ethnic states. The US did not actively seek the Soviet Union's collapse, even attempting to preserve it due to concerns about stability and nuclear weapons.

Ukraine's decision for independence in December 1991 was a pivotal moment in the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As the second-largest Soviet republic in terms of population and economic potential, its departure made the Soviet project unviable for Russia, particularly given concerns about being outnumbered by Muslim republics and the financial burden of supporting other republics. Putin's view of the Soviet collapse as a geopolitical tragedy stems from a perceived loss of great power status and the division of the Russian people.

The discussion delves into the origins of Slavic nations, tracing their historical homeland to the Pripyat marshes region. Kyivan Rus, emerging as a major medieval European state, laid foundational elements for common historical mythology, legal codes, the adoption of Christianity from Byzantium, and written literature. Kyiv's centrality in region's nation-building myths is emphasized, highlighting ongoing historical and territorial disputes.

Moscow's rise to prominence as a center of power occurred in a different context than Kyiv, primarily during the Mongol rule over former Rus lands. While parts of former Rus, including modern-day Ukrainian and Belarusian territories, came under Lithuanian control, Western and Central Russia remained under Mongol influence until the late 15th century. This period saw Moscow emerge as the new capital, embarking on a project to 'gather Russian lands,' which historically included territories extending to the Pacific before reaching Kyiv, ultimately fulfilling this vision under the Soviet Union in 1945.

Despite linguistic similarities, Slavic nations are distinct peoples with varied political traditions. The anonymous 19th-century manuscript "The History of the Rus," which claimed Ukrainian Cossacks as original Rus people, played a significant role in the Ukrainian national revival. This text, and similar nationalist discourse, challenged the Russian Empire's integration model, which relied on elite loyalty rather than national identity. Five attempts at Ukrainian independence in the 20th century underscore a persistent desire for self-determination, manifesting as national communism within Soviet Ukraine and radical nationalism in Polish and Romanian-controlled territories.

Stepan Bandera, a controversial figure, led the Ukrainian nationalists in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Imprisoned by Poland, his resistance gained him hero status among Ukrainian youth. During WWII, he collaborated with Nazi Germany, hoping for Ukrainian independence, leading to his arrest and imprisonment in a concentration camp when the Nazis didn't support a fully independent Ukraine. His myth continued to fuel the Ukrainian Insurgent Army's fight against the Soviets. While accused of being a Nazi collaborator, Plokhy notes the complexity of wartime allegiances, drawing parallels to Stalin's collaboration with Hitler, and highlights the propaganda aspect of labeling Bandera.

Plokhy asserts that while some Nazis and white supremacists exist in Ukraine, they are extremely marginal, more so than in many other European countries or the US. He questions why radical nationalism remains a marginal force in Ukraine, even amidst war, when it's gaining traction elsewhere. Putin's justification for the war as 'denazification' leverages Soviet mythology of fighting fascism, resonating with a Russian populace largely shielded from independent analysis due to a lack of free press. The 2023 Canadian parliament incident, where a Ukrainian SS veteran was applauded, fueled Russian propaganda about a Nazi problem in Ukraine, further demonstrating the power of narrative over factual complexity.

The KGB, though less powerful in the 1950s and 60s, became very influential under Andropov in the 1970s. Plokhy describes it as a huge, secretive organization combining internal secret police, counterintelligence, and foreign intelligence, with immense surveillance capabilities, as extrapolated from open Stasi archives. He argues that Putin, as a former KGB officer, brought the organization's mindset—its methods of planning operations, strategic thinking, and historical resentment towards party leadership—into the Kremlin establishment. This culture, unchecked by a strong party or other institutions, continues to influence Russian foreign policy and decision-making today.

The 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2014 Revolution of Dignity signify Ukraine's growing pro-Western orientation and a rejection of Russian influence. These events, driven by public protest against falsified elections and sudden policy reversals, solidified Ukraine's democratic path and desire for European integration. This westward drift clashed with Putin's agenda of consolidating post-Soviet space under Moscow's control, leading to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the hybrid warfare in Donbas, initially aimed at influencing Ukraine away from the West.

Donbas, historically Ukrainian, became a multi-ethnic region due to industrialization, with a significant Russian population. This economic and ethnocultural mix, coupled with the region's 'rust belt' issues, made it vulnerable to Russian destabilization. Plokhy argues that Russian claims of defending ethnic Russians in Donbas were a pretext, as there was no independent mass mobilization without Russian presence; key figures in the self-proclaimed republics were Russian citizens. The absence of Ukrainian schools and widespread Russian language use in Donbas and Crimea contradicts Russian claims of persecution, highlighting a manipulated narrative to justify intervention.

Putin's 2021 essay, 'On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,' asserts that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are essentially one people, a 19th-century imperial idea. This narrative, also propagated by the Russian Orthodox Church, was largely dismantled by the 1917 revolution, which recognized separate national identities. Plokhy states that Putin's view ignores the historical and cultural distinctiveness of Ukraine, a country whose identity was shaped by rebellion against state authority and a pluralistic political DNA, unlike Russia's state-centric identity. The war's brutality, particularly the bombardment of Ukrainian cities, deeply shocked Ukrainians, fostering a stronger sense of national identity distinct from Russia.

NATO expansion is a recurring justification for the war by Russia, despite Western assurances that Ukraine would not join NATO soon. Plokhy argues that NATO was an excuse, emphasizing that Russia actively blocked Ukraine and Georgia's NATO aspirations in 2008. Putin's demand for NATO's withdrawal to 1997 borders was an impossible ultimatum, revealing that the true cause of the war lies in Russia's desire to control Ukraine's geopolitical orientation, not a defensive reaction to NATO. Finland's recent NATO accession without a significant Russian military response further undermines the 'NATO threat' narrative, pointing instead to historical and imperial ambitions as primary drivers.

The war, viewed as a succession struggle following the Soviet empire's disintegration, has three potential outcomes: victory for either side or a stalemate and compromise. Plokhy sees an end to the war this year as unlikely, with both sides still believing they can achieve military gains. The Russian constitution's incorporation of Ukrainian territories makes a return to 2022 borders impossible without a political change in Moscow. While a ceasefire along current frontlines is plausible, a complete Russian withdrawal requires their military defeat, which is currently improbable given the state of Western support. Negotiations are hindered by Russia's maximalist demands and Ukraine's resolve, fueled by atrocities like the Bucha massacres.

Zelenskyy's decision to dismiss General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, a popular military leader, poses a dangerous moment for Ukraine. While it may signal a shift in war tactics, it raises questions about the balance between political and military leadership during wartime, akin to Truman firing MacArthur. Despite Zelenskyy's declining popularity compared to Zaluzhnyi, the strong national unity cultivated during the war suggests that a military takeover is unlikely. Plokhy believes Zelenskyy's political career is not over and that, like Churchill, he may experience shifts in public support but retain long-term influence.

The Holodomor (1932-1934), a man-made famine in Ukraine resulting from forced collectivization and Stalin's attempts to suppress Ukrainian nationalism, caused millions of deaths. Plokhy connects this tragedy to 20th-century ideologies (communism and fascism) that devalued human life in pursuit of a 'better world' and destroyed populations based on ethnicity or societal class. He argues that humanity has not learned from these lessons, as evidenced by continued ideological conflicts and the easy manipulation of public perception, emphasizing that history's dark aspects can, and do, recur, often propelled by uncritical acceptance of propaganda.

Despite nuclear energy's statistical safety, Plokhy highlights that political and cultural factors make the industry vulnerable to accidents. Authoritarian regimes, secrecy, and lack of experience increase risks, as seen with Chernobyl and Fukushima. The current war in Ukraine, with attacks on nuclear sites like Zaporizhzhia, introduces a new, unprecedented threat: reactors not designed for warfare conditions. Each major incident causes a global freeze on nuclear development, making it an unreliable long-term solution for climate change due to public fear of invisible radiation and collective human responses that prioritize perceived immediate threats over long-term logical assessments.

Plokhy observes a resurgence of Cold War dynamics, with Russia's ambition to re-establish control over post-Soviet space. The war has weakened Russia's image as a superpower, making its vision of a multipolar world with itself as a central pole increasingly difficult to achieve. Simultaneously, the conflict has 'awakened' the transatlantic alliance, mirroring the Cold War's two-bloc system, now centered on Washington and Beijing. Plokhy suggests that the critical historical question is not why the Cold War happened, but how the world managed to avoid a global war for over 70 years, emphasizing the importance of understanding the strategies that kept it 'cold.' He highlights that leaders like Kennedy and Khrushchev, despite their differences, shared a profound fear of nuclear war, prompting them to prevent escalation, an awareness that may be diminished in newer generations.