Summary
Highlights
The video opens by immediately challenging the official 9/11 story, asserting it is a significant lie propagated by politicians, media, and intelligence agencies. It emphasizes that nearly 25 years later, the families of 3,000 victims are still seeking truth. The segment introduces the series' purpose: to build the strongest case for a new, honest 9/11 investigation, free from political or foreign influence. The producers spent months investigating, reviewing primary sources, news reports, and declassified government documents, uncovering shocking findings, particularly concerning former CIA director John Brennan's alleged role in facilitating the 9/11 hijackers' entry into the U.S. and the CIA's efforts to protect them from the FBI.
Mark Rossini, a former FBI agent, recounts his experience at Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, explaining the lack of direct Al Qaeda sources before 9/11. He describes how U.S. intelligence relied heavily on information from the Hada Home Switchboard in Sanaa, Yemen, a communication hub used by bin Laden and his associates. The FBI gained access to this network after the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, thanks to Special Agent John Anticef's interview with Daoud Al-Owhali, a captured perpetrator. This led the FBI to discover a key communication point they were previously unaware of, while the CIA and NSA had been monitoring it since 1996.
The Hada Home was also the residence of the father-in-law of Khalid Al Mihdhar, a future 9/11 hijacker. In late 1999, the CIA and NSA learned Al Mihdhar would travel to Dubai and then Kuala Lumpur for a terror summit. Despite knowing his passport and travel details, the CIA arranged for him to be questioned in Dubai, where his passport was photocopied, revealing a U.S. visa issued from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Court filings suggest these visas were issued to facilitate a joint Saudi and CIA spying operation, with John Brennan, future CIA director, as the station chief in Riyadh at the time. The CIA continued to track Al Mihdhar to Kuala Lumpur, where he met Nawaf Al Hazmi, another future hijacker.
In Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian authorities, at the CIA's behest, surveilled the terror summit. Information from this surveillance, including the hijackers' U.S. visas, was relayed to Alec Station. FBI agents Mark Rossini and Doug Miller attempted to send a Central Intelligence Report (CIR) to the FBI, warning them of the hijackers' U.S. travel plans. However, CIA officer Michael Ann Casey blocked the report, stating it was a 'CIA matter' and that the FBI would only be informed if and when the CIA deemed it necessary. Rossini expresses regret for believing her, leading to a critical information blackout for the FBI.
On January 8, 2000, CIA surveillance reported Al Mihdhar and Al Hazmi boarding a flight to Bangkok, then later a United Airlines flight to Los Angeles. The official account claims the trail went cold, but the video argues the CIA deliberately withheld this information from the FBI. A declassified court filing quotes former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clark claiming the CIA was running a 'false flag operation' to recruit the hijackers. While a spokesperson for former CIA Director George Tenet denied this, Clark's claims suggest a deeper, possibly misguided, CIA strategy to infiltrate Al Qaeda. This alleged 'grand delusion' by the CIA to recruit within the terror cell is presented as the reason for their failure to protect Americans.
The official 9/11 report does not mention the CIA's alleged plan to recruit hijackers, likely because the CIA blocked investigators from interviewing agents involved. The report instead attributed the intelligence failure to different agency strategies: the CIA's 'zone defense' versus the FBI's 'man-to-man approach.' The video criticizes the Commission for not questioning then-CIA Director George Tenet about the Kuala Lumpur summit or the obstruction of the FBI. It asserts that crucial questions remain unanswered because revealing the truth would expose a widespread cover-up.
The hijackers, particularly Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar, lived openly in San Diego for over a year, even listed in the phonebook with their real names. Upon arrival, they met Omar Al Bayoumi, a Saudi intelligence operative. The CIA, prohibited from domestic spying, allegedly used Saudi intelligence, specifically Bayoumi, as a proxy to spy on the hijackers. Bayoumi assisted the hijackers in San Diego, finding them an apartment, cosigning the lease, paying rent, getting them bank accounts, driver's licenses, and introducing them to radical Muslims. Bayoumi's connections and financial support, including funds from the Saudi Embassy via Princess Haifa Bin Faisal, suggest a deeper Saudi involvement that the CIA allegedly used as a cover.
Khalid Al Mihdhar left the U.S. and re-entered on July 4, 2001, despite possessing a multi-visit U.S. visa issued from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia—where John Brennan was running the CIA station. Saudi authorities had reportedly chipped his passport to identify him as a threat, yet he was not stopped. Days before Al Mihdhar's re-entry, an FBI agent at a joint FBI-CIA meeting recognized him from a photograph related to the USS Cole bombing but was denied information by the CIA. The CIA finally alerted the FBI in August 2001, but it was too late. An anonymous FBI agent suggested the CIA's operation 'spun out of control,' leading them to provide limited information to the FBI to locate hijackers without exposing their true operation.
The FBI also had its failures. Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar lived with an FBI informant in California, yet the FBI remained unaware. Less than a month before 9/11, the FBI investigated Zacarias Moussaoui, who received wire transfers from a funder of the hijackers, but agents were denied access to his computer. A July 2001 memo from an FBI agent theorizing coordinated aviation training by bin Laden was not received by headquarters until after 9/11, highlighting the Bureau's outdated systems and lack of internet access. The Bush administration actively concealed these details. Congressional inquiries into 9/11 saw 28 pages concerning hijackers in Southern California redacted. Philip Zelikow, the 9/11 Commission's executive director, made a secret agreement with the White House to screen records, limiting witness interviews. Attempts were made to remove details of Saudi collaboration, with some being buried in footnotes. The video concludes that the official 9/11 Commission report is a lie and a cover-up, questioning how the Bush administration manipulated an independent commission and what they were truly hiding.