Summary
Highlights
Mario introduces Iran's 'horizontal escalation' strategy, where it retaliates by striking across the region and leveraging proxies, exemplified by recent attacks on Kuwait and Dubai. He poses a question to Professor Pape: if a ceasefire including Lebanon is breached by Israel, could Iran escalate by striking Israel's closest ally, the UAE, to impact the global economy without direct confrontation with the US?
Professor Pape elaborates on a specific scenario: if instability in Lebanon continues, Iran could encourage the Houthis to disrupt Red Sea oil exports. This demonstrates Iran's 'escalation leverage' through oil and gas. He notes Iran's calibrated approach to horizontal escalation, which has surprised many who perceived Iran as a 'discombobulated' state. He highlights Iran's ability to calibrate diplomatic and military activities over time, connecting Lebanon's instability to broader Gulf regional dynamics.
Mario asks about the risk of a broader regional war involving more direct parties, such as Iran striking the UAE. Professor Pape believes the risk is moderate to low in the coming months but could rise significantly by January. He explains that prolonged instability will have economic and political effects, weakening governments over time. He draws parallels to the Iran-Iraq War and other historical conflicts, where initial short-war expectations turned into prolonged engagements due to political instabilities and a difficulty for states to exit escalation traps.
Mario expresses concern about numerous red lines being crossed, leading to unprecedented instability. Professor Pape agrees that a direct US-Iran conflict and widespread strikes across the Gulf were once unimaginable but are now reality. He argues that Iran's most rational course of action, despite being labeled a 'crazy state,' is to aggressively develop nuclear weapons for long-term security, especially given the current instability. He estimates a 90% likelihood of Iran testing one or two nuclear weapons within 18 months.
Professor Pape believes Iran has a high chance of successfully building a nuclear weapon, citing their deeply buried caverns for drones as analogous to hiding nuclear facilities. He explains that Iran needs about 1,000 centrifuges working for 12 months in a concealed location to produce enough material for one bomb, followed by two to three months to fashion a basic World War II-style nuclear weapon. He estimates this process could take around 18 months, even if starting from scratch, and notes its difficulty to stop due to Iran's size and potential for multiple hidden facilities. He concludes that one or two nuclear tests from Iran would be a major global shock and a rational move, citing North Korea's example.