SC hearing on Sabarimala women entry highlights Legislature, not courts, entitled to enact social reforms

The Supreme Court's nine-judge bench is deliberating on a crucial matter, referred by a seven-judge bench due to differing interpretations of the 1954 Shirur Mutt ruling. This case originated from a series of questions regarding religious freedom, specifically Articles 25 to 30 of the Constitution. These articles were introduced due to demands from Muslim League members, who remained in India post-partition, aiming to secure protections for Muslims in a secular India. The historical context reveals efforts to ensure Muslim minority protection within the Indian Constitution, as envisioned by leaders like Jinnah aiming to re-establish influence over India.

The current issue before the nine-judge bench stems from the Sabarimala temple entry case. A five-judge bench had previously ruled that women of all ages could enter the Ayyappa Temple, citing 'equality before law.' This decision challenged a long-standing tradition based on the celibate nature of Lord Ayyappa, which restricted women between the ages of 10 and 50 from entering. Justice Nagarathna highlighted the misinterpretation of 'untouchability' (Article 17) in this context, clarifying that the restriction was based on faith and the specific form of Lord Ayyappa, not on women being considered 'untouchable'.

A key question the seven-judge bench referred to the nine-judge bench is who determines the 'integral part' of religious practices: the courts, the state, or the religious community itself. The Solicitor General emphasized that this case is not merely about reviewing the Sabarimala judgment but about revisiting the entire legal framework, starting from the Shirur Mutt case, which allowed state intervention in the administrative and financial aspects of temples but not in religious practices. This re-evaluation aims to define the limits of judicial intervention in religious matters, especially concerning the management and finances of religious institutions.

The core of the current Supreme Court hearing is to establish the interplay between Article 25 (individual religious freedom) and Article 26 (freedom to manage religious affairs by communities). Previously, these articles were often considered separately. The court now seeks to define the scope of individual religious freedom, questioning whether it can supersede community traditions, and how personal freedoms (like marriage or property rights within a religion) interact with broader religious communal rights. The debate also extends to whether any individual, even one outside a specific religion, can challenge its practices through public interest litigation (PIL).

The nine-judge bench must address seven critical questions: 1) What is the scope of religious freedom under Article 25? 2) What is the relationship between Article 25 (individual rights) and Article 26 (community rights)? 3) How do these articles interact with other fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution? 4) What is the role of 'morality' and 'constitutional morality' in religious practices? 5) What is the extent of judicial review over religious practices? 6) What is the meaning of 'sections of Hindus' in Article 25(2)(b), which allows regulation of Hindu religious institutions but not others, and how does this align with secularism? 7) Can an individual not belonging to a particular religion challenge its practices through a PIL? The ultimate goal is to determine the extent of religious authority and its relationship with national welfare and constitutional principles.