Морозов: "Думаю, это закончится так". Что дальше, как в Кремле, мощная атака ВСУ, партия мира, Путин

Alexander Morozov discusses the ongoing tensions between Ukraine and Poland, noting that conflicts are not new, citing past issues like the grain crisis. He explains that current disputes stem from historical memory policies, specifically Ukraine's recognition of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which Poland views controversially. Despite these disagreements, Morozov believes the countries will find a resolution due to the high necessity of cooperation against Russian aggression.

Morozov analyzes the arrest of 'old friends' of Putin, such as Trauber, suggesting it symbolizes a shift in Putin's policy towards a "new state of Putinism," where loyalty is paramount. He views these arrests as an outcome of the FSB's increased influence since the war began, indicating Putin is consolidating power and clearing out anyone suspected of disloyalty. While the current purge might not directly strengthen Putin, it reflects his attempt to build a loyal functional elite for the next decade.

Morozov emphasizes the growing dominance of the FSB in Russian decision-making, even over civilian politicians and IT specialists who oppose certain measures, like internet blockades. He predicts that security concerns will continue to override other considerations, especially as the war progresses. This trend suggests that security services will prevail over the civilian sector, aligning the political system for a prolonged military conflict.

Morozov discusses the upcoming Russian elections, explaining that the presidential administration focuses on preventing regional protests and elite conflicts rather than influencing public mood, which is largely ignored. He highlights that while 'United Russia' might lose some percentages, other loyal parties will gain, maintaining parliamentary control. The main concern for the administration is stability and control of information, ensuring no strong regional or elite conflicts arise during the election period.

Morozov expresses skepticism about the direct impact of Ilya Yashin's new party formed in exile. He argues that creating a political party in emigration in the literal sense is nearly impossible. Instead, it functions more like a club, attracting those aligned with Yashin's charisma. Morozov explains the difficulties of political mobilization among Russian emigrants, most of whom are unwilling to officially join a party labeled as extremist by Russia, due to family ties or assets back home. He concludes that while such groups can serve as platforms for dialogue, their impact on Western politicians is limited without a clear ideological alignment, unlike established Russian parties like Yabloko.

Morozov believes Donald Trump will likely not prioritize the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2025, as his attention will be focused elsewhere, particularly the Middle East (Iran) for the next 90 days, followed by Cuba. He notes that Trump's previous efforts at mediation didn't yield results, and current realities suggest no easy resolution to the conflict. Ukrainian diplomacy, therefore, has an opportunity to strengthen ties with American military structures and European partners.

Morozov discusses Armenia's gradual shift towards Europe, noting the recent European aid package. He expects Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan to seek a balance, maintaining some economic ties with Moscow while continuing to align with the European Union. Russia, however, will likely react harshly to Armenia's pro-European stance, as evidenced by recent statements from Putin, who wants Armenia to choose between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union. The latter is losing its appeal due to the war and sanctions against Russia.

Morozov addresses concerns that Bulgaria might become a 'new Hungary,' referring to its recent veto on sanctions against Russia. He attributes this to President Radev, who is seen as lobbying for Russian interests, particularly those of Lukoil. However, Morozov differentiates Bulgaria from Hungary, where Orbán has consolidated power over a long period. Bulgarian politicians with pro-Russian sympathies have historically lost credibility quickly, suggesting Bulgaria's shift will not be as profound or lasting as Hungary's.