Fire Comes Home: The Mistral Fan Controversy

Sheryl Carland returned home to find her house devastated by a fire, traced back to her 15-year-old Mistral fan. The incident, which caused $10,000 in damages, highlighted a persistent problem with these fans: the interplay of inappropriate electronic components with a flammable plastic casing. The coroner later described these fans as 'time bombs,' noting that their design flaws could lead to sparking, overheating, and rapid ignition of the non-flame-retardant plastic.

Even in 1976, two fires on Mistral's quality control line should have signaled danger. By 1977, an insurance assessor's report detailed a fan-related fire. Consumers repeatedly wrote to Mistral, expressing concerns about the plastic and safety. One letter in 1987 warned, 'please do something before someone is hurt, or even worse, killed.' Faults, including 'resistor and coil burning,' were reported from the Singapore factory, and an engineer even noted, 'Faulty components have been used and a lack of attention to detail in manufacturing processes.' Despite this, Mistral continued to use these components.

Quality control suffered throughout the 1970s and 80s, exemplified by a fire at Royal Melbourne Hospital caused by a Mistral fan. A half-hearted recall campaign in 1977/78, which failed to mention fire risk, only saw 6,300 fans returned. The recall also omitted other problematic models, despite the coroner's 'clear knowledge' of their issues. John Hasker, Mistral's CEO, resigned in 1984, citing 'poor leadership and bad management' and 'inferior quality of products.'

Mistral executives provided misleading figures to the State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV) Approvals Board, understating the proportion of fans causing fires. The SECV's mismanagement of information and inadequate record-keeping further compounded the problem. A concerning twist emerged when Mr. L. Milton, the fan's inventor and a member of the Approvals Board in 1985, influenced a decision not to pursue further action, including a recall, despite clear evidence of danger. The coroner criticized the SECV for its 'lack of competence.' Insurers, despite having access to information about the fires, also failed to raise warnings.

Mistral was aware of international safety advancements. By 1977, while seeking to export to the US, they were informed by Underwriters Laboratories (UL) that their plastic casing failed flammability tests, leading them to construct new samples. Despite this, they did not apply these standards in Australia. Australia's adoption of flammability testing standards in 1978 was notably slow, and prior to 1979, fire safety was not a priority. The coroner noted the 'considerable delay in the introduction of an obvious safety standard.'

Mistral consistently adopted a 'litigious defensive stance' against claimants, forcing fire victims to repeatedly prove their damages. The coroner stated Mistral's response was 'incompetent' at best and 'blatantly expedient' at worst. Following Hasker's resignation, product development manager Kevin Cummins advised management that only a product recall could address the issue. However, no further action was taken and no public warnings were issued. The new purchaser of the Mistral brand in 1987, PDL Industries, was also not informed of the problem (they eventually recalled the fans in 1989).

In 1988, two children, Daniel and Matthew Stott, died in a fire caused by a Mistral fan. The coroner, Mr. Greene Johnstone, concluded that several senior executives from Kemtron Industries Ltd (Mistral's parent company) contributed to these deaths by failing to act on a recall. He named executives who possessed knowledge of the fan fires in 1985, highlighting their failure to prioritize product and public safety. The coroner referred the matter to the director of public prosecutions to consider legal action. The article emphasizes that over 200,000 old Mistral fans remain in circulation, posing a continued risk.