Summary
Highlights
The South China Sea is a crucial international waterway, annually facilitating $5.3 trillion in trade. Major exporting countries like China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan rely on it for maritime trade, particularly for petroleum imports. It also accounts for 12% of the world's annual fish catch and is rich in methane hydrates, a potential energy source for China for 'a hundred years at least'. Countries outside the region, such as the US and EU, also have significant economic interests in the stability of the South China Sea.
Hundreds of small rocks, even those barely above water at high tide, are highly valuable as they grant a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, encompassing significant fish, oil, gas, and mineral resources. This immense value is the root cause of the South China Sea dispute. The tribunal at The Hague upheld that even a low-tide feature could be used to extend a territorial sea, as demonstrated by Pagasa and Subi Reef.
China claims ownership of the South China Sea based on a 2,000-year-old historical narrative of first discovery, naming, exploration, and exploitation. This narrative, taught to every Chinese citizen, is deemed 'totally false'. In 2009, China submitted its nine-dash line map to the UN, claiming everything within it as national territory, a claim later expanded with a tenth dash. This claim is protested by numerous countries, including the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam.
Before WWII, Hainan was China's southernmost territory. After Japan's defeat in WWII, China began its expansion, seizing portions of the Paracels and Itu Aba in 1946, and later taking the rest of the Paracels in 1974. China established a radar weather station on Fiery Cross Reef in 1987, which is now an air naval base. Subsequent seizures include Subi Reef (1988), Mischief Reef (1995), Scarborough Shoal (2012), and Lucuna Shoals (2013). By 2015-2016, China began building air naval bases on artificial islands in the Spratlys, culminating in the seizure of Sand Cay in 2017.
Ambassador Zhao and President Xi Jinping propagated the narrative of China and the Philippines being 'close neighbors for centuries' and claimed Chinese navigator Zheng He visited the Philippines 600 years ago, pre-dating Spanish arrival. This claim is refuted by scholars, including Professor Hsu and Chinese hydrographic experts, proving Zheng He never visited the Philippines. Historical Chinese maps from the Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties consistently show Hainan as China's southernmost territory, disproving claims to the Spratlys or Scarborough Shoal.
Claims of early Chinese presence are further debunked by evidence of 'fake' sovereignty stone markers. A confidential report by Wang Chung, accidentally published in a Chinese book, revealed he planted anti-dated stone markers in the Paracels in 1937, purporting to commemorate inspections from 1901-1911. Similarly, stone markers in the Spratlys, claiming a 1946 erection, were likely placed by the Taiwanese Navy in 1956, as confirmed by editors of a Chinese publication.
China's claim that Gusu Jin, a brilliant Chinese astronomer, built an observatory in Scarborough Shoal in 1279 was first used in 1980 to assert sovereignty over the Paracels. This claim is physically impossible due to the small size of Scarborough's rocks and strategically inconsistent, as the Paracels are 380 nautical miles away. The tribunal concluded China never had historic rights in the South China Sea due to lack of evidence for historical regulation or control.
The 1898 Treaty of Paris, which ceded the Philippines to the US, initially excluded Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys. However, the subsequent 1900 Treaty of Washington clarified that all islands belonging to the Philippine archipelago, whether inside or outside the lines of the Treaty of Paris, were ceded for an additional $100,000. The 1734 Murillo Velarde map, an official Spanish map showing Panacot (Scarborough) and Los Bajos de Paragua (Spratlys), serves as the definitive reference for Philippine territory ceded to the US, confirming these areas as part of the Philippines.
The tribunal ruled that China's nine-dash line claims have no legal effect, designating 20-25% of the South China Sea as high seas. The ruling also established exclusive economic zones (EEZs) for coastal states like the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The Philippines gained 376,000 square kilometers of maritime space, larger than its land territory, free from Chinese claims, encompassing fish, oil, gas, and mineral resources. The tribunal specifically found Mischief Reef to be a low-tide elevation with no territorial sea, forming part of the Philippine EEZ.
Despite China's military presence and infrastructure on Mischief Reef, international naval powers like the US, France, UK, Australia, Japan, India, and Canada are actively enforcing the tribunal's ruling through freedom of navigation operations. These actions directly challenge China's assertiveness by demonstrating that these are either high seas or legitimate EEZs of other coastal states, not China's national waters. The presentation concludes by urging Filipinos to encourage international naval presence and collaborate with ASEAN neighbors to refute China's historical narrative through the rule of law, recognizing that war is not an option under the Philippine constitution and UN charter.