Fire Comes Home: Mistral Fan Dangers Uncovered

Sheryl Carland's 15-year-old Mistral fan, left plugged in but supposedly off, caused a severe house fire, resulting in $10,000 worth of damage. The fire department noted that the well-sealed room and non-flammable materials of the house likely prevented worse devastation. This incident was one of many, revealing a deeper, systemic problem with Mistral fans.

The fires were traced to an interplay of inappropriate electronic components and a new-technology plastic casing that was not flame-retardant. Design deficiencies in capacitors and resistors led to short circuits, overheating, and ignition. Some controls failed to cut off power, leaving fans susceptible to catching fire even when 'off.' The coroner concluded that component failure combined with a flammable casing created a 'time bomb,' as the fan motor could continue operating, fueling the fire with oxygen and providing combustible material.

Even in 1976, two fires occurred on Mistral's quality control line. Consumers began writing to Mistral as early as 1987, expressing concerns about the plastic and inherent safety, with one letter explicitly warning of potential injury or death. News from the Singapore factory reported 'resistor and coil burning,' and a Mistral engineer noted 'faulty components' and 'lack of attention to detail.' Despite these warnings, Mistral continued to order problematic components and the coroner stated that by 1976, designers should have recognized the need for fire reduction measures.

Quality control issues persisted, exemplified by 40 fans sold to the Royal Melbourne Hospital in 1977, assembled from obsolete stock, one of which caused a fire. A half-hearted recall campaign in 1977/78 failed to mention fire risk and was not specific enough, resulting in only 6300 returns. In 1984, Mistral's CEO John Hasker resigned after tabling a damning report, citing 'inferior quality of products' and 'bad management.' Mistral also had difficulties providing information to its product liability insurers and the electricity authority about the fires.

Mistral provided misleading figures to the State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV) Approvals Board, understating the proportion of fires caused by specific problematic fan styles. The SECV Approvals Board mishandled information and failed to keep proper records. In a curious twist, Les Milton, the fan's inventor and a member of the Board, downplayed the problem in 1985, suggesting it was 'confined to a relatively small batch of faulty components.' The coroner expressed 'considerable concern' that Milton's involvement may have influenced the decision not to take further action, accusing the SECV of 'lack of competence'.

Mistral had access to information about international flammability standards, as evidenced by a sample sent to US Underwriters Laboratories in 1977, which failed flammability tests. While a Standards Australia committee was examining flammability testing, internal changes in Australia were slow, with an 'obvious safety standard' facing considerable delay. Mistral made it difficult for consumers seeking redress, taking a 'litigious defensive stance' and encouraging corporations to avoid public responsibilities. The coroner labeled their response as either 'incompetent' or 'blatantly expedient'.

After John Hasker's resignation, Mistral's product development manager, Kevin Cummins, sent a memo in 1985 to management and the company solicitor advising that a product recall was the only solution. However, this recommendation was not acted upon, nor was it disclosed to authorities, insurers, or PDL Industries, who later purchased the Mistral brand. In 1988, two children, Daniel and Matthew Stott, died in a fire caused by a Mistral fan. The coroner concluded that senior executives of Kemtron Industries, Mistral's parent company, contributed to these deaths by not acting on the recall recommendation. Over 200,000 old Mistral fans remain in circulation, posing ongoing risks. The coroner's report highlighted that 'financial expediency and corporate greed' overshadowed public safety, with the core issue being 'management ignorance and a cover-up' combined with 'sloppy quality control' and a 'lack of concern for public safety'.