Summary
Highlights
Sarah Paine defines grand strategy as the integration of all instruments of national power to achieve national objectives. She argues that coordinating these instruments is crucial, citing Japan's failure in World War II due to prioritizing military power over civilian coordination, leading to disastrous outcomes. In contrast, democratic systems like the US allow debates that can lead to more robust strategies.
Paine highlights that leaders in the West, particularly the US and Britain, learned from the failures of World War I, which resulted from generals making strategic decisions without civilian oversight. This led to massive institution-building efforts, like the National Security Act and the creation of the UN and NATO, to integrate national power elements and prevent future devastating conflicts.
Paine discusses Hitler's initial successes with the Blitzkrieg but argues that his hubris and genocidal ambitions led to overextension. She posits that territorial conquest in the post-Industrial Revolution era is a less effective way to build national wealth and security compared to participating in a rules-based international trade system. Those who pursue conquest often "choke on their acquisitions" due to the instability and high costs of maintaining dominated populations.
Paine explains Russia's unexpected resilience in World War II using Sun Tzu's 'death ground' concept. The extreme brutality of the Germans in Russia, particularly in Ukraine, left the population no choice but to fight, forging a formidable national identity. This mirrors current events in Ukraine, where Russian actions are inadvertently strengthening Ukrainian national identity.
Paine differentiates the US policy of unconditional surrender in WWII from genocidal goals. She argues that the US did not put the populations of Germany and Japan on 'death ground,' but rather their leadership. While devastating, the firebombing of cities, for example, did not equate to a policy of extermination, allowing for eventual societal rebuilding and a realization by the populations that their survival was not at stake.
Paine explains the famously high morale and refusal to surrender in the Japanese military as a cultural phenomenon rooted in obligations to in-groups and avoiding dishonor. Emperor Hirohito's late intervention to end the war, despite prior knowledge of atrocities and imperial overextension, illustrates the constraints on his power and the deep-seated cultural norms within Japanese society at the time.
Paine explores a counterfactual scenario where Japan allied with Chinese Nationalists to fight Communists, highlighting the tragic consequences of historical decisions. She contrasts the potential for a more prosperous East Asia with the actual outcomes of communist regimes. She also speculates on the fate of the Third Reich if it had survived, arguing it would have been even more brutal than the Soviet Union due to German efficiency.
Paine refutes the idea that FDR was a communist sympathizer, explaining that alliances during WWII were strategic necessities to defeat Hitler. The immense cost of continued fighting, particularly in Eastern Europe, meant that the US accepted Soviet territorial gains. She also notes that the Cold War was a natural consequence of the primary enemy (Germany) being eliminated, shifting focus back to the ideological conflict between communism and capitalism.
Paine introduces the key distinction between continental and maritime empires. Russia, as a continental empire, emphasizes contiguous territorial expansion, while the British Empire, a maritime power, focused on trade and global connections. This difference explains their varied outcomes post-WWII, with Russia maintaining control over Eastern Europe and Britain granting independence to its territories. She stresses that a maritime, rule-based order fosters wealth through trade and international institutions, contrasting it with the destructive nature of continental expansion.
Paine connects economic policies like the Hawley-Smoot tariff to disastrous geopolitical consequences, leading to Japan's invasion of Manchuria. She emphasizes the importance of understanding international interactions and avoiding "half-court tennis" in strategy. She defines "pivotal errors" as decisions that fundamentally alter the status quo, citing Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and Putin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine as examples.
Paine discusses how actions intended as deterrence can often be seen as provocations. She argues that the expansion of NATO was a defensive measure for Eastern European countries fearful of Russia, rather than an unprovoked escalation. She acknowledges the existential risk of nuclear war but emphasizes that local populations' desires and agency, such as Ukraine's willingness to fight, should not be dismissed for the sake of appeasing belligerent powers.
Paine explains the success of post-WWII occupations in Germany and Japan by highlighting their pre-existing functional institutions, educated populations, and strong national identities. The US helped rebuild, not create from scratch, and implemented reforms like universal suffrage and land reform that permanently altered power dynamics. This contrasts with Afghanistan and Iraq, which lacked these foundational elements and faced internal ethnic conflicts and external interference.
Paine explores the historical development and current challenges of China. She notes that the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) drive to maintain a monopoly on political power, rather than maximize societal welfare, drives many of its decisions, such as extensive surveillance and suppressing economic innovation. She warns that China's current trajectory, similar to past authoritarian states, is likely to depress growth and lead to disastrous outcomes, especially if it attempts to take Taiwan by force, which would lead to international isolation.
Paine reflects on the importance of extensive reading, linguistic skills, and open-mindedness in understanding history and strategy. She highlights the unique educational environment of the Naval War College, where team-taught courses and diverse colleagues foster a deeper understanding of strategic concepts, particularly the distinction between continental and maritime powers. This knowledge is crucial for US foreign policy, as its maritime position allows for choices about intervention that continental powers lack.
Paine urges technologists to consider the broader geopolitical implications of their creations. She challenges them to ask whether their technologies privilege dictatorships or democracies, emphasizing that the vitality of the tech industry depends on a stable, rules-based international order. She also encourages supporting foreign investment in developing nations to alleviate global instability and improve national security.