Marty Levitt A Dirty Business 4of4

Marty Levitt, a former union avoidance consultant for 20 years, discusses his personal journey from working against unions to advocating for them. He highlights the destructive nature of union busting, calling it a 'dirty business' and 'corporate terrorism'. Levitt aims to expose the missing pieces of union-busting dynamics and how every worker is a victim of these practices. He plans to share his entry into and exit from the industry, its history and growth, and practical ways to 'bust the union buster'.

Levitt recounts his early career as a headhunter and his accidental entry into union busting in 1969 with John Sheridan Associates, a pioneer in the field. He initially believed he was providing a beneficial 'preventative labor relations' service. Over time, he built a successful union-busting practice, earning a quarter-million dollars annually, which justified his actions despite seeing the 'human destruction' it caused. His turning point came in 1983 while working with the United Mine Workers, witnessing blatant setups and the severe impact on workers. He realized he was hurting people and that the positive reports from companies after campaigns were deceptive. Levitt became an alcoholic, eventually seeking help at Hazelden, where he decided to leave the industry and write a book, 'A Dirty Business,' to expose these practices. He now works for labor, aiming to defuse the 'dirty industry.' The industry has grown from a few hundred practitioners in 1969 to over ten thousand in 1990, becoming a multi-billion dollar, unregulated industry that thrives on employer ignorance, fear, greed, and ego.

Levitt role-plays a union buster's kickoff meeting with management. The company president sets a hostile tone, declaring 'war' on the union and emphasizing that its defeat is the number one priority. The consultant then takes over, manipulating supervisors by telling them the union represents a lack of trust in management. He redefines a union as a 'business' solely focused on 'money' (dues, fees, assessments). The consultant explains how unions, having lost membership, are desperate to recover, and aim to educate employees that unions cannot guarantee anything but collecting dues and potentially leading to strikes. He introduces the legal framework, noting what supervisors cannot do (threaten, interrogate, promise, spy) but subtly shows how those restrictions can be circumvented. He points out that authorization cards are presented falsely as merely information-gathering, when they are, in fact, membership applications or blank checks for the union.

The consultant explains how collective bargaining is depicted as 'horse trading,' where employees might get less. He emphasizes that union demands like security clauses are negotiable. He then turns to union finances, citing the Landrum-Griffin Act and LM-2 forms to portray unions as mismanaging funds, particularly by highlighting a 'zero' on the 'on behalf of individual members' line. Union constitutions are twisted to appear as oppressive tools, emphasizing oaths, quorum rules that allow a few members to make significant decisions, and 'kangaroo courts' that punish dissenting members. Meanwhile, the union buster operates behind the scenes, setting up employees for dismissal, creating divisions among workers, and making minor improvements to working conditions to undermine union support. The campaign culminates in a tearful plea from the company president, humbly asking employees to 'vote no' and promising improvements that rarely materialize. After a union defeat, key pro-union employees are systematically eliminated, often under false pretenses, to prevent future organizing efforts.

Levitt addresses the Greyhound dispute, asserting it's not a bargaining impasse but a deliberate union-busting plan he indirectly helped devise in the 1970s. Greyhound amassed a $50 million war chest and subtly started recruiting replacement drivers while using a public relations agency to create pro-company, anti-union narratives. Psychological profiling was used to select scabs based on anti-union sentiment. He suggests that acts of violence during the strike, like bus shootings, might be orchestrated by union-busting security agencies to demonize the union and justify the company's refusal to negotiate. Since Ronald Reagan's actions against PATCO, decertification has become a lucrative aspect of union busting, often involving a three-year plan to undermine a union after a contract is signed, through subtle improvements and identifying divisions among workers.

Levitt asserts that union busters cannot handle 'the light of day' and exposure. He highlights a case where exposing a consultant at a Catholic hospital led to their termination within 48 hours. He encourages unions to identify and publicize the names, lifestyles, and strategies of consultants to make them an issue, thus contaminating the company's image. He points to the Landrum-Griffin Act, which requires 'direct third-party persuader' consultants to register with the Department of Labor (DOL) and file financial disclosures. Many consultants avoid this by working through supervisors, but careless ones engage in direct persuader activity without disclosure. He advises unions to contact the DOL if a consultant is engaging in direct persuader activity without registration. A DOL investigation, even without significant penalties, can rattle employers and expose consultant vulnerabilities. He also suggests that union committee members can subtly engage exposed consultants in conversation to confirm their persuader role, then use this information to prompt a DOL investigation. Levitt stresses the importance of educating and preparing organizing committees to counter the predictable strategies of union busters, empowering them against manipulative tactics.