Summary
Highlights
Socrates is awaiting trial for impiety, while Euthyphro is prosecuting his own father for the murder of a dependent. Euthyphro’s father had bound and left a murderous slave in a ditch, who subsequently died from hunger and exposure. Euthyphro believes his family's anger at him for prosecuting his father shows their ignorance of divine matters, whereas he is confident in his advanced knowledge of piety and impiety.
Socrates expresses his confidence that Euthyphro, by undertaking such a prosecution, must possess perfect knowledge of piety. As Socrates himself is being tried for impiety, he suggests becoming Euthyphro's disciple. He even contemplates challenging his accuser, Meletus, by stating that if Euthyphro's theological views are approved, then Socrates, as his disciple, should also be approved.
Euthyphro defines piety as doing what he is doing: prosecuting anyone guilty of murder, sacrilege, or similar crimes, regardless of their relation. He cites Zeus's actions against his father Cronus and Cronus's actions against Uranus as divine precedents for punishing wrongdoers, even within one's own family. Socrates questions if Euthyphro truly believes these stories about the gods, to which Euthyphro affirms, claiming further amazing revelations.
Socrates insists on a more general definition of piety, not just examples. He asks for the essence or 'idea' that makes all pious things pious. Euthyphro then proposes that 'piety is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them'.
Socrates points out that the gods are known to have enmities and differences, particularly concerning what is just, unjust, good, or evil. Therefore, what one god loves, another might hate, making the same action both pious and impious according to Euthyphro's definition. Socrates argues that even in human courts, disputes are not about whether wrongdoers should be punished, but about who committed the wrongdoing and its nature.
Socrates suggests amending the definition: 'What all the gods hate is impious, and what they all love is pious or holy.' Euthyphro agrees to this revised definition. However, Socrates then introduces the crucial question: 'Is the pious beloved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is beloved of the gods?'.
Socrates explains the distinction between an action (like being carried) and the state it produces (being carried). He concludes that something is loved by the gods because it is loved by them, but it is holy because it possesses an intrinsic quality of holiness. Therefore, 'dear to the gods' is an attribute of the holy, not its essence. Euthyphro admits he struggles to articulate his meaning as their arguments seem to 'walk away' from them.
Socrates endeavors to guide Euthyphro, asking if all that is pious is just. They agree upon an analogy: just as reverence is a part of fear (but not all fear is reverence), so too is piety a part of justice but not all justice is piety. Euthyphro then defines piety as 'that part of justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice which attends to men'.
Socrates questions the meaning of 'attention' in this context. He clarifies that attention usually implies benefiting or improving the object of attention (e.g., horsemanship benefits horses). Euthyphro clarifies that 'attention to the gods' does not mean making the gods better, but rather a 'ministration' or service, similar to how servants attend to their masters.
Socrates probes further, asking what 'work' this ministration helps the gods accomplish. Euthyphro suggests piety is 'learning how to please the Gods in word and deed by prayers and sacrifices'. He then defines sacrificing as giving to the gods, and prayer as asking of them, concluding that piety is a 'science of asking and giving'.
Socrates points out that gifts to the gods are not for their benefit but are tributes of honor, things that please them. This brings the argument back to the initial definition of piety as 'what is dear to the gods', thus completing a circle. Euthyphro, admitting he is in a hurry, leaves Socrates, who laments his dashed hopes of learning about piety to defend himself against Meletus's charges.