Summary
Highlights
Socrates is awaiting trial for impiety, while Euthyphro is prosecuting his own father for murder. Euthyphro's father bound a dependent who had killed a domestic slave and left him in a ditch, where he died. Euthyphro considers prosecuting his father pious, as it aligns with what he believes the gods would approve.
Socrates, facing an impiety charge, expresses his desire to learn the true nature of piety and impiety from Euthyphro, who claims to have exact knowledge of such matters. He even suggests that if he becomes Euthyphro's disciple, Meletus, his accuser, should indict Euthyphro first.
Euthyphro defines piety as doing what he is doing: prosecuting anyone guilty of murder or sacrilege, regardless of their relation. He cites Zeus punishing his father Cronus as a divine precedent for his action, suggesting that gods also punish wrongdoers.
Socrates questions Euthyphro's belief in these traditional tales of gods fighting and having conflicts, especially regarding justice and injustice. He points out that if gods quarrel, then what is dear to one god might be hateful to another, making it impossible for a single action to be universally pious. This contradicts Euthyphro's initial definition.
Euthyphro amends his definition, stating that impiety is what all the gods hate, and piety is what all the gods love. Socrates agrees to examine this definition further, seeking a universal standard for piety.
Socrates poses a critical question: Is an action pious because it is loved by the gods, or is it loved by the gods because it is pious? Through a series of analogies, he demonstrates that being loved is an attribute, not the essence, of piety. Piety must possess its inherent quality that causes the gods to love it, rather than being defined by their love.
Euthyphro then suggests that piety is a part of justice – specifically, the part that attends to the gods, similar to how another part of justice attends to men. Socrates seeks clarification on the nature of this 'attention' to the gods.
Socrates clarifies that 'attention' as applied to horses or dogs implies benefit or improvement. Since humans cannot benefit or improve the gods, Euthyphro redefines attention as a 'ministration' or service to the gods, akin to how servants serve masters to achieve a certain objective.
Euthyphro's final attempt defines piety as learning how to please the gods in word and deed, through prayers and sacrifices. Socrates interprets this as a 'science of asking and giving' – asking for what humans want from the gods, and giving to the gods in return what they want from humans. However, Socrates points out that gods give everything good, but it's unclear what good humans can offer in return aside from honor and pleasing them. This brings the argument back to the initial problem: piety is defined as pleasing to the gods, which is an attribute rather than its essence.
Socrates concludes that their argument has circled back to the same point, unable to define the essence of piety. He expresses his weariness but his continued desire to learn. Euthyphro, however, states he is in a hurry and leaves, leaving Socrates without a definitive answer, and still facing his trial for impiety.